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THE PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
OF CHAiM PERELMAN
MITCHELL FRANKIN*
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TraitM de l'argumentation
P ERELMAN'S TraitM de l'argumentation1 is an important work because he
forces scholarly reconsideration of problems, both of philosophy of law
and of philosophy in general. His writing is philosophically significant, because
he reintroduces dialectic into philosophical discussion, from which it has been
excluded by the distaste for it among bourgeois thinkers who fear the Marxist
outcome of the dialectic. However, Perelman's conception of dialectic is anti-
Hegelian and anti-Marxist. Indeed, it constitutes a rejection of Hegelian and
Marxist conceptions of dialectic because it is in part founded on Kantian and
Neo-Kantian ideas. Perhaps it would not be too fanciful to describe his work as
a confrontation between Kant's Critique of Judgment and Hegel's criticism
thereof in Hegel's Aesthetics. However, Hegel is rarely mentioned by Perelman,
and his reference to Kant is largely to the Critique of Practical Reason. The
principal sources of his theory of argumentation come from the ancient Greek
world.
Perelman's Traitj de l'argumentation is important because he compels
reconsideration of problems of philosophy of law. He discusses philosophy of
law as an aspect of his general philosophic theory of dialectic or argumentation.
This leads him to suggest that legal argumentation, based on the carefully
structured contestation of the rival parties or subjects of law in a competent
court, which makes a reasoned determination or decision, should be regarded
as the ideal for the solution of problems arising within various social sciences.
Thus, he makes a distinction between the formal logic of the physical sciences
and the dialectical logic of the social and human sciences. The influence of the
Neo-Kantian distinction between Erklirung or explication and Versteken or
comprihension as rival theories of knowledge may be here perceived. This ex-
plains the importance of two recent works which Perelman has edited. One is
a volume of antinomies in law.2 The other is a work concerned with lacunae or
gaps in the legal order.3 The latter is a valuable contribution to the theory of
legal or juridical method. Although there have been twenty-six centuries of
the history of Roman and civil law, the scholarly history of the legal method
of such Roman and Romanist law really begins only in 1840 with Savigny.
It is not entirely an accident that revived theory of the role of legal argumenta-
tion and of legal method should come from Perelman, who is involved both in
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; Professor of Law
Emeritus, Tulane University; A.B., 1922, LL.B., 1925, SJ.D., 1928, Harvard University.
1. C. PERELmr r et OLBREcETS-TrTECA, LA NOUV E RHATORIQUE TRAiTE DE L'ARGU-
MENTATION, tomes 1 et 2 (1958).
2. C. PERairzr, LES A MnoMs EN DROIT (1965).
3. C. PERmR .m, Lx PRoBLEmE DEs LACUNEs EN DRoT (1968).
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the ancient theory of argumentation and in twenty-six centuries of Roman
legal history, because the ancient history of theory of argumentation and the
history of Romanist legal method at times have been inter-related.
II. DIALECTIC AND RoMAN LAW
Following some discussion in 1936,4 Professor Fritz Schulz stated in 1946
the importance of Greek ideas of dialectic in developing Roman law, and con-
demned philosophers for not acknowledging this.5
The importation of dialectic [from Greek thought] was a matter of
extreme significance in the history of Roman jurisprudence and there-
fore of jurisprudence generally. It introduced Roman jurisprudence
into the circle of the Hellenistic professional sciences and turned it
into a science in the sense in which that term is used by Plato and
Aristotle no less than by Kant. It is only systematic research and
organized knowledge that can properly be so called, and these are
attainable only by the dialectical method. It is only through dialectic
that Roman jurisprudence became fully logical, achieved unity and
cognoscibility, reached its full stature, and developed its refinement.
Not only does dialectic subsume individual phenomena under their
genera; it is also an instrument of discovery, suggesting, when applied
to jurisprudence, problems which have not actually occurred in
practice ... Plato's enthusiastic laudation of the dialectical method
is seen to be fully justified: for Roman jurisprudence it proved to be
verily the fire of Prometheus.6
Thus, in Schulz' thought dialectic explains the strength of Roman law. Al-
though I have written that "Schulz' conception of dialectic is extremely re-
stricted,"7 because it is not Hegelian, what he has said should be carefully
studied. In a footnote Schulz says that the role of dialectic in Roman law is
"not sufficiently noticed by historians of Roman jurisprudence and entirely
ignored by historians of philosophy." s Schulz was partially wrong, because
Hegel attacked the Stoicism of Roman law.9 In his majestic Encyclopedic
Dictionary of Roman Law, Adolf Berger published his bibliography concerning
the role of the rhetor in Roman law.10 Even before Schulz, Professor Adouard
Cuq, among modern Romanists, had indicated the role of Greek dialectic in
making Roman law a science. The second edition of Cuq was published in
4. F. ScHuLz, PpIucipL.s or Rom= LAW 15, 124, 129 (Wolff tr. 1936).
5. F. Sc-uLz, HI STORY or ROmAN LEGAL ScI EcE 62, 66, 67, 76 (1946). See Franklin,
Bracton, Para-Bracton(s) and the Vicarage of the Roman Law, 42 TuL. L. REv. 455, 466
(1968).
6. Schulz, supra note 5 at 67.
7. Franklin, supra note 5.
8. Schulz, supra note 5, at 67 n.6.
9. Franklin, The Significance of Stoicism in the Development and Outcome of Hegel's
Theory of Alienation, 1958 AcTA JuPmicA 246.
10. A. BRoE, ENCYCLOPEDIC DIcTIONARY or Ro A LAW 685, 804 (Transactions of
the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Part 2) (1953).
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1928.11 Mention should also be made of Professor Eduardo J. Couture who had
lectured on the dialectic of the Romanist judgment some years ago.'
In 1967, Professor Peter Stein wrote:
In recent years . . . scholars of Roman law have come to accept the
law of the classical period as something dynamic and have been con-
centrating their attention on the nature of juristic argument during
that period. Two valuable studies, from widely differing viewpoints, are
that of Professor Max Kaser, Zur Methode der rimiscken Rechtsfind-
ung [published in 1962], and that of Professor Erwin Seidl, Pro-
legomena zu einer Methodenlehre der Rimer [published in 1966].13
Stein's own work, Regulae juris, disagrees with aspects of Schulz' discussion of
dialectic in Roman law.14 A few years before Stein, Professor H. F. Jolowicz
had explored the role of regulae juris in Roman law.15 Jolowicz seems at times
to have been unaware that he was confronting the philosophic problem of the
dialectical unity-in-opposition of the general and particular which is buried in
the texts of legal maxims and legal common places. The theory of the new
rhetoric has been carefully discussed by Professor Jacob D. Hyman.16 Because
of his hostility to formulated texts relating to the theory of aggression in inter-
national law, it may be significant that Professor Julius Stone has yielded
considerably to the influence of Perelman.17 Professor Karl Larenz18 does not
mention Perelman, but discusses, juridically and philosophically, the small
volume, Topik und Jurisprudenz,19 written by Theodor Viehweg. Viehweg
acknowledges his relation to Perelman.2 0 His preface to the third edition states
the importance of the work of Professor Luis Recas6ns Siches and of Stone.21
The first edition of Viehweg's work appeared in 1954 and the third edition in
1965. The latter contains an elaborate bibliography 22 Professor H. L. A. Hart
is under the influence of Perelman.23
III. AiSTOTLE AND KANT
The most distinguished theorist of "common places" is, of course, Aristotle,
whose Topics is concerned with the dialectic of argumentation or of controversy
11. E. CuQ, MANU DES NwSTrrUTiONS JURIDIQUES DES ROmAwS 40 (2d ed. 1928).
12. See E. COUTURE, INTRODUCTION A L'ETUDE DE LA PROCEDURE CIVLE (1950).
13. Stein, Justice Cardozo, Marcus Terentius Varro and the Roman Juristic Process,
THE IRISH JURIST 366, 368 (1967) (Second Series).
14. P. STEIN, REGULAE JURS FROM JuRIsTIc RULE TO LEGAL. MAIMs 52 (1966). Pro-
fessor Stein recognizes the importance of Professor David Daube, of Oxford.
15. H. Jolowicz, Roman Regulae and English Maxims, 1 STUDI IN MsEMORIA DI PAOLO
KoscHAxER "L'Europa e il Diritto Romano" 213 (1953).
16. Hyman, Concerning the Responsibility and the Craftsmanship of the Judge: A
Review of Julius Stone's Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning in the Light of Recent
Criticism of the Supreme Court, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 347, 354 (1965).
17. J. STONE, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasoning 327 (1964).
18. K. LARENz, METHODOLOGIA DE LA CIENCIA DEL DERECHO 147 (Ordeig tr. 1966).
19. T. VIERWEG, Topni umD JUESpRUDENZ (1965).
20. Id. at i.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2.
23. H. HART, INTRODUCTION TO PERELMAN, ME IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF
ARMu NT vii (Petrie tr. 1963).
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or of contestation. W. A. de Pater holds that Aristotle's Topics is important,
not merely as content, but as method. "The Topics," de Pater writes, "does not
present a heap of places, but a dynamic method, worked out by the style of
example, so that it is not necessary to be disconcerted by the weighty number
of laws mentioned." 24 Furthermore, de Pater writes, ". . . [T]he place is a
principle and a proposition (or premise) common to several arguments .... 125
De Pater has sharpened the discussion of Aristotle's common places in
several important ways. He has removed the common places from the content
of law to the methodology of law and thus the work of Aristotle becomes an
aspect of the problem of legal method which has been so prominent in the
history of legal theory since Savigny's discussion of legal method was pub-
lished in the first half of the nineteenth century. Hegel held that Aristotle's
Topics or "places" were methodological. Hegel, influenced by Bruno and
perhaps by his own dialectical methodology of the unity-in-opposition of the
abstract-concrete, said:
, [I]n [the Topics] the points of view from which any thing can be
considered are enumerated. .. Aristotle gives a large number of general
points of view which can be taken of an object, a proposition or a
problem; each problem can be directly reduced to these different
points of view that must everywhere appear. Thus these "places" are,
so to speak, a system of many aspects under which an object can be
regarded in investigating it ... [T]he knowledge of points of view at
once places in our hands the possibility of arriving at the various as-
pects of a subject, and embracing its whole extent in accordance with
these points of view ... This, according to Aristotle, is the function
Dialectic, which he calls an instrument for finding propositions and
conclusions out of probabilities .... 26
Contemporary bourgeois interest in Aristotle's Topics may be designed to
veer Aristotle to subjectivistic Kantianism and ultimately to subjectivistic Neo-
Kantianism and its various manifestations. De Pater's discussion suggests that
Topics, understood as Kantian or Neo-Kantian methodology, is valuable to
contemporary bourgeois jurists because such method is ambiguous or existential.
That is to say, it may establish the Kantian freedom of the jurist to exploit
possibilties or d~placement, or placement as displacement, or harmony as
disharmony. The vulnerability of the subjects of law to the ambiguity of the
common place is suggested by de Pater's idea that the place is a principle,
proposition or premise "common to several arguments." 2
24. W. DE PATER, LES TOPIQUES D'ARIsTOTE ET LA DIALECTIQUE PLATONICIENNr LA
METHODOLOGIE DE LA DEFINITION 230 (1965).
25. De Pater, La fonction du lieu et d'instrument dans les Topiques, in ARISTOTLE ON
DALECTC, Tax Topics, PROCEEDINGS or Tm TH U Symosruu AisTOmSTuCU 164, 177
(Owen ed. 1968).
26. 2 G. HEGEL, LPcTuREs ON THE HISTOR OF PHIOSOPHY 217 (Haldane and
Simson tr. 1894). See also volume 3 at 129.
27. Supra note 25.
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
IV. A CRITICISm OF PERELMAN's DIALECTIC
Because he has involved and subordinated Aristotle to Kant, it is necessary
to consider Perelman's dialectic of legal argument or contestation as Kantian
and Neo-Kantian in that he precipitates a Kantian legal argument between
abstract, unhistoric, fettered or limited subjects of law, and resolves the contra-
diction by the mediation of the self-determination or freedom of the jurist who
exploits or subjectively chooses among the possibilities offered by the alienated
or fettered subjects of law. In choosing his freedom or in making his choices
Perelman expects, but in no way requires, the bourgeois jurist to be bound by
"precedent." By precedent Perelman does not merely mean prior Anglo-
American judicial determinations, but also the formulated constitutions, the
formulated codes of Romanist national states and the formulated texts of inter-
national law. Thus, his Kantian dialectic puts the bourgeois legal order at the
disposal of the futurist demands of monopoly capitalism without jeopardizing
bourgeois social relations.
These older and more recent writings show the important role of Perelman
in seeking to revive the role of dialectic both in law and in the philosophy of
the social sciences.
This is said even though Perelman's conception of dialectic may be re-
jected. This rivalry, at least in the history of Roman law, may sharpen. For
some decades, Roman legal scholarship seemed to have arrived, exhausted, at
the terminus of interpolationism and thus to lose its presence-in-the-world.
However, since movement for the reconsideration of Roman law from the point
of view of dialectical (historical) materialism has arisen, Perelman's anti-
Hegelian, anti-Marxist dialectic may be intended to confront dialectical (his-
torical) materialism. Hence there may be in the making controversy between
different conceptions of dialectic.
V. AN HEGELIAN CRITICISM OF PERELMAN'S KANTIANISM
A critic of Perelman's conception of dialectic occupies a position similar to
that of Schiller to Kant. In his remarkable discussion of Kant's Critique of
Judgment, which appears in Hegel's Aesthetics, Hegel said:
It constitutes the starting-point for the true conception of the beauty
of art. Such a conception could however, only make itself effective as
the higher comprehension of the true union of necessity and freedom,
particular and universal, sensuous and rational, by its overcoming
the defects still latent in the previous standpoint. It must be admitted
that the artistic sense of a profound and, at the same time, philosoph-
ical spirit anticipated philosophy in the stricter sense by its demand
for and expression of the principle of totality and reconciliation in its
opposition to that abstract finiteness of thought ... that understand-
ing faculty devoid of any substantive content, which one and all ap-
prehend nature and reality, sense and feeling, merely as a limit ... It
is Schiller who must be credited with the important service of having
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broken through the Kantian subjectivity and abstractness of thought,
and of having ventured the attempt to pass beyond the same by
comprehending in thought the principles of unity and reconciliation
as the truth.... 28
Hegel is thus criticizing Kant who acknowledged contradiction, but who
merely surmounted the rivalry by subjectivizing it. As Hegel says, this Kant
did by conceiving the contradictory forces as limited, abstract or fettered. The
contradictory forces were forces-in-themselves, but not also forces-for-other.
Kant then subordinates these motionless or unrelated forces through the motion
of a deus ex machina or external force, which dominates the limited rival
elements and chooses freely or arbitrarily among them.
Where Hegel perceived mediation or negation through the inter-penetrating
self-motion of the contradictory elements, Kant perceived the external mediator
who with agility selected his possibilities among the fettered or (in social life)
alienated or appropriated forces. In the Critique of Judgment Kant wrote:
Hence we see that the removal of the antimony of the aesthetical
judgment takes a course similar to that pursued by the critique in the
solution of the antinomies of pure theoretical reason. And thus here,
as also in the Critique of Practical Reason, the antinomies force us
against our will to look beyond the sensible and to seek in the super-
sensible the point of union for all our a priori faculties, because no
other expedient is left to make our reason harmonious with itself.
20
Kant himself states that his Critique of Judgment was not only an aesthetic
theory, but also an attempt to relate aesthetic taste to moral ideas and "the
culture of the moral feeling."30 A weakness of Marcuse is that he blunts or
weakens Hegel's condemnation of Kant. Marcuse writes:
In the Critique of Judgment the aesthetic dimension and the
corresponding feeling of pleasure emerge not merely as a third dimen-
sion and faculty of the mind, but as its center, the medium through
which nature becomes susceptible to freedom, necessity to autonomy.
In this mediation, the aesthetic function is a "symbolic" one ...In
Kant's system, morality is the realm of freedom, in which practical
reason realizes itself under self-given laws. Beauty symbolizes this
realm in so far as it demonstrates intuitively the reality of freedom.8 '
But Schiller grasped and solved the matter dialectically.
Beauty, it is said, links together two conditions which are opposed to
each other and can never be one. It is from this opposition that we
must start; we must comprehend and recognize it in its whole purity
and strictness, so that the two conditions are separated in the most
definite way; otherwise we are mixing but not uniting them ... [I] t is
said that Beauty combines those two opposite conditions, and thus
28. 1 G. HEGEL, Tem Pmrosorxr or F=nr ART 83 (Osmaston tr. 1920).
29. I. KANT, CrrQxU or JuDGMWT 186 (Bernard tr. 1951).
30. Id. at 202.
31. H. MARcuSE, EROs AND CIrv AI0ioz; A PxnmosopncAL INQUMY INTO FREUD 199
(1955).
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removes the opposition, but since both conditions remain eternally
opposed to one another, they can only be combined by cancellation
(aulgehoben). Our . . . business, then, is to make this combination
perfect, to accomplish it so purely and completely that both conditions
entirely disappear in a third, and no trace of the division remains
behind in the whole; otherwise we are isolating, but not uniting
them.32
The role of Perelman's jurist in the world of bourgeois property and
social conditions is praetorian, cassational or para-legal. Although Perelman
asserts the rationalism of legal argumentation or contestation, the rationalism
of the method of argumentation justifies the domination of the rationalism of
the jurist. Because of the Kantian limits imposed on the forces involved and,
hence, their lack of the necessary interpenetration, the jurist or the external
mediator seizes, appropriates, alienates or limits the forces involved in the
legal argument. There is thus juridical conquest reflecting the alienation in the
social infra-structure.
Perelman, himself, relates his Kantianism not to the Critique of Judgment,
but in large measure to the Critique of Practical Reason. Perelman writes:
The conclusion recalls Kant's categorical imperative. Let us
examine Kant's ideas more closely. This will give a more exact idea of
how my theses are similar to his, and how they differ from them... We
may translate Kant's categorical imperative into judicial language as
follows: "You must conduct yourself as if you were a judge whose
ratio decidendi was to furnish a principle valid for all men." Apart
from my emphasis on precedents, to which the ratio decidendi must
be related, my formulation seems at first glance to differ very little
from Kant's categorical imperative. Yet its actual meaning is different
because of the clear distinction that Kant establishes between the sub-
jective and the objective. In opposing maxims to laws, Kant tells us
that the maxim is subjective because the subject considers the condi-
tion that determines his will to be valid only for his will. The law, in
contrast, is objective if the condition is recognized to be valid for the
will of every reasonable man. This dichotomy, with its opposition
between the individual and the universal, seems to me to be contra-
dictory to the facts and altogether chimerical. As soon as we formulate
principles of action, whatever they may be, those principles eliminate
something of the arbitrary from our conduct. Our behavior, being
regulated, is no longer entirely dependent on our subjective whims...
What we actually do find is a progressive universalization of our moral
principles, which allows us gradually to elaborate reasonable principles
of action for all mankind. The essential function of the philosopher is,
perhaps, to formulate such practical principles .... s
Because of his insensitivity to history-even to the brutal history of his own
century-Perelman does not acknowledge that the bourgeois subject of law
may be historically fettered or limited. Instead Perelman seems to conceive
32. J. SCHILLER, ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN 88 (Snell tr. 1954).
33. C. PERELuN, JusTc 76 (1967).
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that the subject of law is a carrier of objective spirit or objective idealism. Per-
haps, in this regard, he is following Schelling or Savigny. For the latter, law
was the Volksgeist or national spirit revealed through custom or exteriorized
by practical activity. But Savigny's theory of the Volksgeist was merely a form
of appropriative alienation, in which Savigny veered the subject of law into
the object of the Volksgeist, and then veered the new subject, the Volksgeist,
into the object of the new subject, the agile or ironic jurist, to whom both
subjects of law and Volksgeist were objects. Thus, it appears that Perelman's
departure from Kant signifies that the former has eliminated the class struggle
idea which was hidden in Kant's presentation by replacing it with a theory of
the essential unity or indifference or harmony of the subjects of law. At the
same time he preserves Kant's categorical imperative by which the jurist rules
the subjects of law as objects, through his agility, freedom or acrobatism.
But in truth the agility of Perelman's categorical imperative or of
Perelman's jurist is a superfluity unless there is an historic contradiction among
alienated or limited subjects of law. By means of the categorical imperative,
Kant undertook, within the limits of the weakness of the German bourgeoisie
of the late eighteenth century, to negate or to alienate feudal alienation and
to bring eighteenth century Germany abreast of the French revolution. The
importance of his Critique of Judgment is that he clearly introduces the genius
or artist, who when metamorphosed into the jurist (as was done in effect by
Savigny), enjoys the role of sovereign mediator who dominates the rivalry
between feudal and bourgeois forces. This external mediator enjoys the role
of the unhistoric prince in the French thought of the mechanistic eighteenth
century, who was designed through his enlightened laws to replace feudal social
relations with bourgeois social relations. Because he conceived that the rivalry
of social forces should not be resolved by the self-motion of the historic rivals
themselves, who are thus limited or alienated, Kant's mediator-jurist is also
imposed from without. As Claude Bruaire could add, Kant's mediator-artist-
jurist also enjoys the role once played by the mediator-artist-priest-jurist over
the contradictory, unstable consciousness of European feudalism, which was
torn between heaven and earth, and which therefore was seized or alienated by
the medieval mediatorA4 Kant's Critique of Judgment immediately leads to the
6litist, agile, ambiguous secular mediator. The categorical imperative of Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason, to which Perelman commits himself, leads to the
hegemony of the holy moral legislator. However, as the holy moral legislator,
who in time issues from the thought of the Critique of Practical Reason is
merely postulated by Kant, he is succeeded as mediator by the artist-genius in
the Critique of Judgment, where Kant attempts to necessitate his hegemony. It
may be hinted that Kant may have yearned for a judge even in the Critique of
Pure Reason.35
34. C. BRUAIRE, LoGiQuE ET RELIGION CHRTIEMNNE DANS lA PHILOSOPHIE DE HmoEL, 152,
156 (1964).
35. See I. KANT, CRIQuE oF PuR REAsOT 480, 486 (MUller tr. 1966).
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VI. PERELmAN'S THEORY OF CONTESTATION
Perelman's theory of the judicial contestation of the subjects of law, which
justifies the role of the common places or centrum in his thought, must be exam-
ined closely. A weakness is that his theory of contestation does not explain the
role of the ex parte or default judgment, where there is, of course, no contesta-
tion. These judgments are increasingly prominent in American law, especially
in the area of Conflict of Laws. Moreover, where there seems to be contestation,
which is ordinarily true, Perelman does not seem to grapple with the fact that
the contest or common place is coerced or forced by the state. But in kin-orga-
nized society the contestation was founded on a self-determined submission to
the artist-genius-jurist by the subjects of law. In Roman law this was the prin-
ciple of litis contestatio, which perhaps found an echo in the political and legal
theory of the social contract. Before the period of Aristotle, Socrates had been
condemned because of his conduct in respect to an aspect of this matter. Hegel's
discussion of the trial of Socrates from this point of view is too detailed to be
considered here.36 However, with the emergence of the state, based on private
property, self-determined submission was in effect overcome and replaced by
coerced submission to judicial process. Aristotle's considerations relative to con-
tentious common places should be studied in connection with the ideas of self-
determined submission, such as or similar to litis contestatio. The problem is
whether Aristotle justified mediation founded on the self-determination of free
subjects of law or founded on the free mediator who imposed his own freedom
as mediator on unfree, coerced or alienated subjects of law. Professor Wenger
raised the question whether the formulary procedure of Roman law was influ-
enced by the Topics.37
In relating the condemnation of Moosbrugger for murder in The Man
Without Qualities, Musil, who says that the convicted man 11... [H]imself ...
was a world," 38 shows through him that the historic role of litis contestatio has
been reversed by bourgeois reality. Musil writes of Moosbrugger:
When the president of the court read the finding that declared him
responsible for his actions, Moosbrugger rose and addressed the courts:
'I am satisfied I have attained my object.' Scornful incredulity in the
eyes round about answered him, and he added angrily: 'As a result of
having forced the court to try me, I am satisfied with the conduct of
the case!' The president of the court, who had now become all severity
and condemnation, rebuked him, remarking that the court was not
concerned whether he was satisfied or not. Then he read the death sen-
tence to him, exactly as though the nonsense that Moosbrugger had
been talking all through the trial, to the delight of all present had now
for once received a serious answer.3 9
36. See 1 HEGEL supra note 26 at 440.
37. See H. WExGER, THE INsTrriT.s OF E RomA LAW Or CiviL. PROCEDURE 140,
n.18(a) (Fisk tr., rev. ed. 1940).
38. Quoted in THE Ex S=T=Ii I-AG NATIoN 161 (Karl and Hamalian, eds. 1963).
39. Id. at 162.
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Again, Hegel must be mentioned, because his theory is that punishment even
by the state is a self-determination of the criminal.40 But this requires bourgeois
coercion or bourgeois appropriative alienation of the consciousness of the
criminal.
Part of Perelman's thinking is devoted to creating the structure within
which the coerced or compelled legal argumentation or legal contestation is
initiated and develops. This contentious structure is the truth of the research
into the facts of the contest which includes and justifies the hegemony of the
jurist or judge of the conflict.
Through this structure Perelman creates the form which Kantianism and
Neo-Kantianism require, a form which fetters the subject of law and unfetters
the jurist or judge. A Neo-Kantian precursor of Perelman is Stammler, who
intended a natural law with a variable content. But Professor Rommen, the
scholastic jurist, writes of Stammler: "Stammler distinguishes, in a Kantian
sense, it is true, and not in an Aristotelian, the form and the content of law.
'Form' signifies for him condition (a priori): the problem, then, consists in find-
ing in what conditions the positive law is just law. Therefore it is not the ques-
tion of a juridical content, but, as in the ethic of Kant, of a pure form in which
several contents can take place." 41 The Kantian jurist, or, more exactly, the
methodology of the Kantian jurist gains the power to choose and to impose the
content of law. It is not yet possible to say that Perelman's jurist is existential.
The rationalism of argumentation seems to preclude this. However, the criterion
of existentialism is not abstract rationalism, but existential theory of possibility.
"The conceptual instrument, i.e., the category that existentialism employs in
all of its forms," Professor Abbagnano writes, "is that of possibility. In fact,
it carries out the analysis of human existence in the world as the analysis of
the possibilities open to man in his confrontation with men and things."42 Pro-
fessor George Schrader, inspired by Kant's Critique of Judgment, moves from
Kant to existentialism:
No man, in Kant's view, is born with a moral character. He is endowed
at birth with neither the actuality nor the potentiality of one. If he
is to have a character at all, he must create it. It is a possibility which
confronts him, but again not as anything determinate. He has no
model to guide him, but must construct it. The model is the form in
which he represents himself to himself under the idea of freedom. If
he takes the model too seriously, he negates the freedom which it was
intended to serve and instruct. To use Kant's terminology, the model is
a schema and functions symbolically. It gives expression to the ideal in
concrete form and thus provides a rule for action; but at the same time
it refers beyond itself as does the work of art.4 3
40. G. HEGEL, PHrmosoPirz OF RIGHT 70 (Knox tr. 1942).
41. H. RoMamm', LE DRorT NATUREL 166 (Marmy tr. 1945). See LAmwz, supra note 18
at 148.
42. N. ABBAGwANO, CTrTcAL EXIsTm Is 226 (Langiulil tr. 1969).
43. G. Schrader, The Philosophy of Existence, in THE PHILosoPmy or KANT AND OUR
MODER WORLD 25, 42 (Hendel ed. 1957). See M. HEDEGGER, BEING AND TmE 217
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Thus, reversing the apparent order, the positive civil code becomes the pro jet
or Entwurf of existentialism. It is only a schema.
VII. PERELMAN'S JUSTIFICATION OF KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Perelman's jurist determines himself by the categorical imperative of
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, though Kant himself may be said to show
that the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment also introduce
or make possible the mediator,44 who through his ambiguity or agility rules
contradictory forces which are fettered, limited, finite or alienated. In law this
means that the subjects of law are veered into objects of law. A large part of
Hegel's entire thinking is devoted to condemning the agility or arbitrariness of
the mediator. It is not necessary to review here these extensive and ample
materials,4 5 save in regard to Kant's conception of the categorical imperative.
Here Hegel holds in effect that because the imperative is a bourgeois "ought,"
which remains to be realized in history through the overthrow of feudalism by
the bourgeoisie, the holy moral legislator must be postulated. As the Kantian
"ought" is a postponement of the Kantian "is," the holy moral legislator, the
mediator, may seek out his possibilities or his freedom. Perelman states his own
Kantian thought as follows:
Experience of the relations between rules and the will shows us there
is rarely a purely subjective rule and that we can never be sure of
dealing with an objectively objective and universally valid rule. What
we actually do find is a progressive universalization of our moral prin-
ciples, which allows us gradually to elaborate reasonable principles of
action for all mankind .... But to propose does not mean to impose.
The distinction must be maintained at all cost.46
Despite bourgeois theory of the rule of law,47 Kant's "ought" legitimates
the agility, equivocation, Verstellung or displacement of the place by the media-
tor or holy moral legislator. The meaning of Verstellung, Hegel says, is that
consciousness is confronted by a "perfect nest" of Kantian "contradictions." 48
Consciousness proceeds
by fixing definitely one moment, passing thence immediately over to
another, and doing away with the first. But, as soon as it has set up
(Macquarrie and Robinson tr. 1962); R. Grabau, Karl Jaspers Communication through
Transcendence in ExmsTExNamL PxuosoP:mms: KIERxEGAARD TO MERLEAU-PONTY 109, 128
(Schrader ed. 1967); S. BEAuvom, Tnz ETifcs or AlBIGuiTY 129 (Frechtman tr. 1945);
J. WID and J. EDIE, INTRODUCTION, MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE or PnmosoPHy xix (Wild
and Edie tr. 1963); H. BARNzs, THE LrTERATURE Or PossiBmiTY 365 (1959); Franklin,
The Kantian Foundations of the Historical School of Law of Savigny, 22 REVISTA jURIDICA
DE LA UNiRsioAD DE PUERTO Rico 64, 86 (1952/1953). See generally 2 G. HEGEL, SczEcE
or LoGIC 181 (Johnston and Struthers tr. 1929).
44. Supra note 29.
45. See Franklin, Sketch of an Historical Foundation For A Tribunitial Theory of
Conflict of Laws, 41 TuL. L. REv. 579, 619 (1967).
46. Perelman, supra note 33 at 78.
47. G. HEGEL, Tnz PHENOMENOLOGY orAlnD 670 (Bailie Jr. 1931).
48. Id. at 629.
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this second moment, it also "shifts" (verstellt) this again, and really
makes the opposite the essential element. At the same time, it is con-
scious of its contradiction and of its shuffling, for it passes from one
moment, immediately in its relation to this very moment, right over to
the opposite. Because a moment has for it no reality at all, it affirms
that very moment as real: or, what comes to the same thing, in order
to assert one moment as per se existent, it asserts the opposite as the
per se existent. It thereby confesses that, as a matter of fact, it is in
earnest about neither of them. The various moments of this vertiginous
fraudulent process we must look at more closely.49
As he develops his condemnation of Kant, Hegel says:
The concrete moral consciousness . . . is an active one; that is precisely
what constitutes the actuality of its morality. In the very process of
acting, however, that 'place' or semblance is immediately 'displaced,'
is dissembled; for action is nothing else than the actualization of the
inner moral purpose, nothing but the production of an actuality con-
stituted and determined by the purpose; in other words, the production
of the harmony of moral purpose and reality itself.50
In the theory of Kantian Verstellung the legal subject, as mediator, as agile
jurist, dominates or rules the legal object, the so-called subject of law, the
apparent "parties" in ordinary Anglo-American legal language. In L'heritage
kantien, Professor Jules Vuillemin has laid a foundation for understanding and
mastering Hegel's criticism of Kant.51 Professor Lewis W. Beck's discussion of
Kant is important, too, but it is marred because it is insufficiently linked to
Hegel.
Just as a schema was the 'third thing' that could mediate between pure
concept and pure intuition, the type must be a third thing that can
mediate between the concept of nature, all that is, and the concept of
what ought to be. The third thing in the practical judgment is the con-
cept of law itself as definitive of a realm or kingdom. Nature is phe-
nomena under law, and natural law provides a type or model by which
we can think the practical law in concreto.52
In the Philosophy of Law, Hegel considers German romantic legal irony as legal
Verstellung.
To impose on this way on others is hypocrisy; while to impose on
oneself is a stage beyond hypocrisy, a stage at which subjectivity
claims to be absolute. This final, most abstruse form of evil, whereby
evil is perverted into good and good into evil, and consciousness, in
being aware of its power to effect this perversion, is also made aware of
itself as absolute, is the high-water mark of subjectivity at the level
49. Id. at 629. See contra, without mentioning Hegel, Ebbinghaus, Interpretation and
Misinterpretation of the Categorical Imperative, in KANT: A CoLLECTION op CRiTicAL EssAYs
211, 216 (Wolff ed. 1967).
50. Supra note 47 at 630.
51. J. VumiLkzr, L'xrRITAGE KANTIEN E LA REVOLUTION COPERNICIENNE 1 (1954).
52. L. BEcx, A COMMENTARY N KANT'S CRrTQuE or PRAcTicAL REASON 158 (1960).
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of morality; it is the form into which evil has blossomed in our present
epoch .... 0
This states the problem which confronts theory of the possibilities of the
existential mediator. This is perceived by Julius Stone, who mentions that when
there is resort to rhetorical arguments "the legal system is 'open,' in the sense
that it does not offer mechanical keys to determinate solutions. This, as we have
sufficiently stressed, does not mean that choice is at large, or that decisions may
not command a degree of conviction, springing from their anchorage in the
tdpoi, the truths taken as common grounds for the time being."54 But Abbag-
nano penetrates to the philosophical crux of the matter, when, according to
Nino Langiulli, he holds ". . that the possible is the category of comprehension.
To understand, says Abbagnano, signifies taking account of that which makes
something possible, i.e., grasping a possible in its constitutive possibility." 55
Professor Larenz emphasizes that Viehweg says the solution of juridical prob-
lems moves within a "comprehensive relation." 56 This should be taken to mean,
as was stated at the beginning of this essay, that Perelman's treatment of
Aristotle's theory of argumentation, has been drawn within the anti-causal,
individuating Neo-Kantian conception of Versteken, the chief weapon of Neo-
Kantianism against law-governed ideas of the social and human sciences of
Hegel and of Marx.
This may explain why Perelman has committed himself, not to Kant's
Critique of Judgment, but to the categorical imperative of Kant's Critique of
Practical Judgment. It may be that Perelman turned to the Critique of Practical
Reason, hoping to overcome the weakness of Versteken theory, flowing from
the utter subjectivity of such thinking. It has been shown that Hegel believed
that Verstellung or equivocation or ambiguity was present in the three critiques
and also that Kant mentioned the essential unity of the three works. 57 However,
it may be believed that existentialism, or certain types of existentialism, may
rescue Kant's categorical imperative from the subjectivity of Verstehen theory.
It may be believed that the weakness of Verstehen theory may be overcome or
minimized if Versteken theory is buttressed by objective idealism, including
undialectical Neo-Hegelianism. Perelman seems to have introduced objective
idealism in presenting his subjects of law. This, too, affects the situation of the
mediator. Because of the arbitrariness of original Verstehen theory, the need of
strengthening the authority of the mediator by introducing objective idealism
within this area also exists. This, for example, seems to be the outcome of the
"place" (Ort) in the social theory of Emil Brunner. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to justify the role of objective idealism if the starting point is Neo-Kantian,
53. HEGEL, supra note 40 at 94. Cf. HypPOLITE, GEmsE ET SETUCTmE DE LA PHE-
NOMENOLOGIE DE HEGEL 467 (1946).
54. STONE, supra note 17 at 332.
55. ABBAGNAANO, supra note 49 at xx.
56. LARENz, supra note 18 at 147.
57. Supra note 29.
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because the problem of "double" or divided idealism emerges.5 This is a
problem which Savigny could not solve during the nineteenth century when he
supported both the Volksgeist and the jurist-mediator.5 9
In invoking Kant's categorical imperative today Perelman perhaps may be
seeking to offer a Neo-Kantian "doubled" or divided idealism in which there
is both the subjective idealism of the agile jurist and the objective idealism of
some "humanist" or culture or even religious theory.60 Perhaps Heidegger also
attempted this eclecticism in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Heidegger
here in part considers Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. He seizes on Kant's
original theory of productive imagination (Einbildungshrajt) and relates it to
the phenomenological concept of intentionality, which could be understood to
justify veering between subjective and objective idealism.6 1
VIII. AN HEGELIAN VIEw OF PERELIAN AS A THEORIST or ALIENATION
In discussing the struggle between the sophists and their enemies in the
history of Greek philosophy Hegel shows what is at stake in considering argu-
mentation and the role of the jurist. "Thus the Sophists were more especially
the teachers of oratory," Hegel writes, "and that is the aspect in which the
individual could make himself esteemed amongst the people as well as carry
out what was best for the people; this certainly characterizes a democratic
constitution, in which the citizens have the ultimate decision."0 2 Against this
outlook, Hegel writes, "... Socrates expresses dissent and surprise at Protagoras'
assertion as to imparting instruction in political aptitude. 'I thought that the
political virtues could not be learned,' for it is Socrates' main tenet that virtue
cannot be taught." 63 Hegel, in effect, reopens this discussion in his defense of
58. See generally H. Mouomr, LA SAIlN'TE FAILE .xszSNTz xsm 118, 166 (1947).
59. Franklin, supra note 45 at 637.
60. "Now what makes the specific quality of our western civilization is the way in
which to the stream formed by the rationalist Graeco-Roman tradition is added the Judeo-
Christian religious tradition, which draws its spirituality from the primacy accorded to thejust God, the model of perfect conduct, and to the just man inspired by that divine model
both in his thought and in his action. In contrast to the juridical view of the Romans and
the philosophical view of the Greeks, the Judeo-Christian view of justice is essentially
prophetic, for it is through the prophets as intermediaries that God reveals himself to men."
C. PERELmAI, TE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM or ARGUMENT 72 (Petrie tr. 1963).
"Once we recognize history as a real process, the problems of causality, values, and
objective knowledge in history can be answered, Troeltsch believes . . .The cultural values
are no longer subjective, but possess objective value ... The aim of historical study , .. is
not restricted to the understanding of the unique and particular; it also involves the study
of common characteristics . . . According to Troeltsch, history is not governed by laws of
nature in the sense of the natural sciences or by a rigid Hegelian dialectics. Nevertheless, it
shows a certain coherence and unified development from common points of origin to
common goals." G. IGGERS, THE GERMAN CONCEPTION OF HsrToRY: THE NATIONAL TRADI-
TION or HISTORICAL THOUGHT PROM HERDER TO THE PRESENT 181 (1968). For Troeltsch
"what makes intuitive understanding possible is the unity of all spiritual reality through
the mediation of God." Id. at 193.
61. See M. HEIDEGGER, KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS 162 (Churchill tr.
1962).
62. 1 HEGEL, supra note 26 at 358.
63. Id. at 361.
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the French Enlightenment, which justified codification or the content of law
instead of legal method.
What the philosophers brought forward and maintained... was,
speaking generally, the men should no longer be in the position of
laymen, either with regard to religion or to law; so that in religious
matters there should not be a hierarchy, a limited and selected number
of priests, and in the same way there should not be in legal matters
an exclusive caste and society (not even a class of professional law-
yers), in whom should reside, and to whom should be restricted, the
knowledge of what is eternal, divine, true, and right, and by whom
other men should be commanded and directed; but that human reason
should have the right of giving its assent and its opinion. 64
Unlike Hegel, however, Perelman asks:
Is it to the rhetor or the philosopher ... that we must entrust the
task of completing the upbringing of the man and citizen, of the one
who is to govern the city and watch over its destiny? 5
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, in his own way, says that it is
private property which precipitates the coerced legal contestation or legal argu-
ment and which alienates or appropriates or limits the subject of law, because
private property itself is based on alienation or occupatio. "Wealth has within
it from the first the aspect of self-existence (Firsicksein)," he writes. "It is not
the self-less universal of state-power, or the unconstrained simplicity of the
natural life of spirit; it is state-power as holding its own by effort of will in
opposition to a will that wants to get the mastery over it and get enjoyment off
of it.",65
What should be perceived here is that because "wealth" is based on aliena-
tion or seizure, it requires or creates the existence of the state,67 which itself,
however, Hegel feels, alienates or limits the alienator. This is not by depriving
the property-owner of his property, but by abstracting him from historically-
created humanity by veering him into an abstraction, into a non-being who is
not a human being but a limited legal person.68
From every particular aspect self-consciousness can abstract and for
that reason, even when under an obligation to one of these aspects
retains the recognition and inherent validity of self-consciousness as an
independent reality. Here, however, it finds that, as regards its own
ego, its own proper and peculiar actuality, it is outside itself and
belongs to another, finds its personality as such dependent on the
chance personality of an other, on the accident of a moment, of an
64. Id. volume 3 at 390.
65. Perelman, Rhetoric and Philosophy, 1 PH osopny AND R~a-oRc 15 (Johnstone
tr. 1968).
66. HaGFL, supra note 47 at 536.
67. Franklin, supra note 5 at 518.
68. "As capitalist, he is only capital personified. His soul is the soul of capital. But
capital has one single life impulse, the tendency to create value and surplus-value . . .
K. MLA.x, CAirrA 257 (Moore and Aveling tr. 1906).
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arbitrary caprice, or some other utterly irrelevant circumstance . . .
In the sphere of legal right ... the self sees its self-certainty as such
to be the most unreal of all, finds its pure personality to be absolutely
without the character of personality.69
In reality this means that because of his ownership, the so-called subject of
law is veered by alienation or limitation into an object of law, and that the
unfettered jurist, or, more accurately, the unfettered legal method of the jurist
becomes the subject of law.
Hegel condemned Roman law because of its Stoicism or abstract universal-
ity. Stoicism seemed to be a flight from or abstraction from the property rela-
tions of Roman slavery. " 'Stoical self consciousness,'" he writes, ". . . was the
outcome of 'Lordship and Bondage' .... 70T he abstractness of the content of
such Stoic Roman law concealed the alienating or appropriating power of the
jurist over the limited subject of law.
The actual content, the proper value of what is "mine'"-whether it
be an external possession or again inner riches or poverty of mind and
character-is not contained in this empty form and does not concern
it. The content belongs, therefore, to a peculiar specific power, which is
something different from the formal universal, is chance and caprice.
Consciousness of right, therefore, even in the very process of making
its claim good, experiences the loss of its own reality, discovers its
complete lack of inherent substantiality; and to describe an individual
as a "person" to use an expression of contempt. The free and un-
checked power possessed by the content takes determinate shape in
this way. The absolute plurality of dispersed atomic personalities is,
by the nature of this characteristic feature, gathered at the same time
into a single centre, alien to them and just as devoid of the life of spirit
(geistlos). That central point . . . has the significance of the entire
content, and hence is taken to be the essential element .... 71
This central point or place of alienation is Perelman's common place, the
,place also of displacement. While Hegel here is condemning the alienating power
of the Roman prince, this is a development from the power of the Stoic jurist,
the centre of Roman law. "Stoicism is nothing else," Hegel writes in this dis-
cussion, "than the mood of consciousness which reduces to its abstract form
the principle of legal status, the principle of the sphere of right [law] . . .-72
As has been said, Perelman links his thought to the abstract universal of Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason, which Hegel condemned because of its similarity
to Stoicism.73 With Kant, Hegel says, ". . . we at once come back to the lack
of content."7 4 But this lack of content is a way of rule by the jurist, a way of
69. HEGEL, supra note 47 at 537.
70. Id. at 502.
71. HEG., supra note 47 at 504.
72. Id. at 502.
73. HEGEL, supra note 26, volume 3 at 424, 460.
74. Id. at 460.
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domination, a way of alienation through legal argumentation or legal contesta-
tion.
In the Rechtsphilosophie Hegel who accepts the state, civil rights and
liberties, the jury, and codification, makes a Kafka-like criticism of the method-
ology of the jurist who alienates the legal argument through his role as the
mediator:
Owing to the character of the entire body of the laws, knowledge both
of what is right and also of the course of legal proceedings may be-
come, together with the capacity to prosecute an action at law, the
property of a class which makes itself an exclusive caste by the use of
a terminology like a foreign tongue to those whose rights are at issue.
If this happens, the members of civil society, who depend for their
livelihood on their industry, on their own knowledge and will, are kept
strangers to the law, not only to those parts of it affecting their most
personal and intimate affairs, but also to its substantive and rational
basis, the right itself, and the result is that they become the wards, or
even in a sense the bondsmen, of the legal profession. They may indeed
have the right to appear in court in person and to "stand" here (in
judicio stare), but their bodily presence is a trifle if their minds are
not to be there also, if they are not to follow the proceedings with their
own knowledge, and if the justice they receive remains in their eyes a
doom pronounced ab extra.75
Hegel's presentation is not only Kafka-like, but anticipates Vdsquez, who writes
of the "monodimensionality" of the "existence" of Kafka's subject of law.76
Vdsquez perhaps also had in mind Marcuse's one-dimensional man.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Three conclusions may be drawn from the considerations presented. First,
insofar as justice is justice dominated by the legal method of the jurist it
should be governed by the tribunitial principle which emerged in republican
Roman law. This means that those social forces which have proved their reality
by struggle for recognition must concur in judicial determinations.77 This re-
quires that jurists representing the social forces acknowledging each other have
the power of intercessio or of interposition. The principle of unanimity of the
permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations is an
example.
Second, Perelman in part justifies and requires legal argumentation because
of Montesquieuan ideas of the separation of powers. But Hegel pointed out
that each of the powers of the state involved the same moments as the others,7 8
including the moment of judgment. Immediately after the American revolution
the abb6 de Mably advised the Americans to invest the continental congress
itself with the highest judicial power. This is sufficient to suggest that if possible
75. HEGEL, supra note 40 at 145.
76. A. VAsQnxz, LA 3DFAS ESTETICAS DE MARX 141 (1965).
77. Franklin, supra note 45 at 580.
78. HEG L, supra note 40 at 175.
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the American masses should support that sector of the state which for the time
being represents or approximately represents mass interest.79 In the period of
President Roosevelt the masses recognized the virtue of the presidency as
against the Supreme Court. Following his victory over the Supreme Court, the
masses for several decades correctly have acknowledged the virtue of the Su-
preme Court. This veering is justified both by the ambiguous structure of the
First or original constitution of Philadelphia and by the first and fifth amend-
ments introduced through the Bill of Rights. Third, under actual conditions the
jurist concerned with the interest of the masses should actively condemn
alienating theory of legal method, for otherwise he risks strengthening such
alienation through his triumph in a particular argument or contestation.
In his Refutation of Helv9tius Diderot quotes the following: "There is no
better form of government, said the King of Prussia, in a speech made to the
Academy of Berlin, than the arbitrary rule of a just, humane, and virtuous
prince." To this Diderot replies:
And it is you, Helv&ius who quote this tyrant's maxim with
approbation! The arbitrary rule of a just and enlightened prince is
always bad. His virtues are the most dangerous and the surest form of
seduction: they lull a people imperceptibly into the habit of loving,
respecting, and serving his successor, whoever that successor may be,
no matter how wicked or stupid . .. One of the greatest misfortunes
that could befall a nation would be two or three successive periods of
rule by a just, gentle, enlightened, but arbitrary power . . . If the
English had been ruled by three Elizabeths in succession, they would
now be the basest slaves in all Europe.80
As Perelman has said in a different context in a most recent work, "... in
philosophy there is no thing adjudged,"8' no res judicata.
79. Franklin, Influence of the AbbJ de Mably and of Le Mercier de la Rivigre on
American Constitutional Ideas Concerning the Republic and Judicial Review, in PEaspec-
Tins oF LAw:EssAYs FoR Aus=n~ WAxmm ScoTr 96, 125 (Pound, Griswold, Sutherland
ed. 1964).
80. L. CnocmR, DmraoT's SELEcrED WrTmos 297 (Colman tr. 1966).
81. C. PE EAN, Daorr, moRALE ET PEmuosorP.m 56 (1968).
